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ARV   Antiretroviral treatments 
CBHI   Community Based Health Insurance schemes  
CHE   CHE 
CIPRES   Conférence Interafricaine de la Prévoyance Sociale 
CTP   Capacity to Pay  
EIP   Extended Immunization Programs 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product  
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
LMIC   Low and Middle Income Countries 
MHI   Mutual Health Insurance 
MoH   Ministry of Health  
MSA   Medical savings accounts  
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization  
NHIS   National Health Insurance Scheme  
OOP   Out-Of-Pocket 
RAMU   Régime d’Assurance Maladie Universelle 
SAP   Structural Adjustment Programs 
SHI   Social health insurance  
SP   Seguro Popular (Popular Security) 
TB   Taxed Based Financing 
THE   Total Health Expenditure 
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UHC   Universal Health Care  
VAT   Value-Added Tax 







In West Africa, among the sixteen (16) countries1, only six (6) are classified as low-middle 
income countries: Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal. The 
others are low income countries. Regardless of the income level, health is one of the most 
important challenges of West African countries as morbidity indicators show a double 
burden with resurgent communicable diseases and emergent non-communicable diseases. 
Malaria, lower respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases and HIV/AIDS are the top 4 killers2, 
despite governments’ efforts to provide for mosquito nets and Antiretroviral (ARV) 
treatments. 
After independence, almost French West African colonies inherited and continued the 
colonial health systems. In many of these countries, disparities (in terms of infrastructure, 
access to care and health outcomes) between regions and between urban/rural settings 
were acute. Changes began when health financing priorities were guided by a focus on 
primary health care (following the Alma Ata conference in 1978) and decentralization and 
targeted cost recovery reforms3 (subsequent to the Bamako initiative in 1987). Following the 
economic crisis and the devaluation of the FCFA in 1993, most of the countries which were 
highly indebted implemented the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Structural adjustment 
Programs (SAPs). The health component generalized cost recovery and introduced user fees. 
As a result, health financing is generally the responsibility of the private sector, and given the 
fact that there was a very low degree of coverage of risk pooling mechanisms, health 
expenditures are mainly out-of-pocket (OOP). Households bore on average 50.125 % in 2009 
and 47.375% in 2010 of the burden of Total Health Expenditures (THE). 
Hence, Community Based Health Insurance schemes (CBHI) or Micro-Health Insurance (MHI) 
schemes have mushroomed in many countries (Lahkar and Sundaram-Stukel, 2010) as an 
alternative to market-based insurance for poor people. However, this led to extreme 
1 According to the UN Population, West Africa comprises: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and 
Togo. 




                                                     
fragmentation of the health system with multiple small pools (of resources and risks) and 
which has not been completely successful in protecting the very poor4. 
In 2001, the Abuja Declaration showed the awareness of the African Head of States that 
governments have to be more involved in health sector financing. More recent conferences 
and key organizations now urge for a more dynamic move towards universal coverage as a 
solution to impoverishment and financial risk born by the population5. In the Stratégie pour 
la Santé en Afrique de l’Union africaine of 2007, the African Union (AU) affirmed that it is 
important to look at the possibility of instituting social protection for vulnerable people to 
avoid long-term indebtedness due to health shocks6. Later in 2010 and 2012, the 
organization reaffirmed her commitment for universal coverage7. 
Since the 2005 World Health Assembly, the 2010 World Health Report, and the 2011 World 
Health Assembly, several declarations and donors also exhort countries to move towards 
universal coverage to protect their population from health shocks and impoverishment. In 
2012, the Bangkok (28th January), Mexico (2nd April) and Tunis (July) declarations culminated 
in a December resolution of the United Nations reflecting these calls8. 
According to the World Health Ogranization (WHO)9, Universal coverage means that 
everyone has access to quality health services that they need without risking financial 
hardship from paying for them. “On paper”, universal coverage can be achieved by raising 
sufficient funds, reduce the reliance on direct payments to finance services, and improve 
efficiency and equity10. It emphasizes that: “Simply choosing from a menu of options, or 
importing what has worked in other settings, will not be sufficient. Health financing strategy 
needs to be home-grown, pushing towards universal coverage out of existing terrain. It is 
imperative, therefore, that countries develop their capacities to analyse and understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of the system in place so that they can adapt health financing 
policies accordingly, implement them, and monitor and modify them over time. ” 
4 Gilson et al., 2000; Jutting, 2004; Lahkar and Sundaram-Stukel, 2010. 
5 WHO (2010) 
6 African Union (2007)  
7 Union Africaine (2010 et 2012) 
8 Ministère de la santé et de la lutte contre le Sida (2012) 
9 WHO (2013); http://www.who.int/whr/2013/main_messages/en/index.html  
10 WHO, 2010  
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It is then worth reflecting on the prospect, challenges and opportunities of instituting such 
systems in francophone West African settings and to assess the contribution of research in 
this quest for answers. 
Objectives 
The objective of this briefing note is to analyze the current health financing systems in 
francophone West African countries. Specifically, the note will: 
1. Describe the current health financing systems in francophone West African 
countries; 
2. Highlight potential future orientations and challenges; 
3. Derive Highlight lessons from health financing in other settings that could inform 
reform in francophone West African countries, and  
4. Point out knowledge gaps and future research paths. 
Justification 
In most of the countries of the study, there is a high incidence of OOP spending on health 
while they are in majority (7 out of 10) low income countries. It is recognized that there is a 
need to reform the current health system financing mechanisms to achieve universal health 
coverage for health care. However, little is known about the challenges and opportunities for 
health system financing in francophone West Africa. This briefing note is intended for policy-
makers and all stakeholders involved in preparing and implementing reforms to reach 
universal health coverage. It will point out challenges at the technical level as well as the 
policy and research levels. Special attention will be given to equity, governance and 
sustainability issues during the analysis. It can be used to direct future research and 
orientation for health financing reforms in West Africa. 
The remainder of the note is structured as follows. Section I presents a brief review of 
literature of the different modalities to finance the health system. Section II overviews the 
situation in francophone West African countries and compiles lessons on health financing in 
Asia and Latin America Section III presents IDRC-funded research results, highlighting 
existing gaps and future research paths. Finally, Section IV concludes. 
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Section I: REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON FINANCING SCHEMES 
FOR HEALTH CARE11 
Financing schemes in health care have been extensively studied in the economic literature. 
This section presents an overview of private and public financing schemes analyzed through 
the lenses of their advantages and drawbacks and highlight implications for universal 
coverage. 
A. Private initiatives 
Private initiatives are market-based health insurance and Community based-health 
insurance schemes (CBHI). In these features, membership is voluntary (except in some job-
based insurance schemes). 
1. Marked-based insurance schemes 
Individual health insurance and job-based health insurance are the market-based health 
insurance schemes. The individual private health insurance scheme is funded by OOP 
payment (for premiums and health care costs). In some cases, these outlays include a 
deductible amount that is born by the client and some other features. Entry into the scheme 
is usually based on experience-rating12 and ends up by cherry-picking13. Generally, 
contributing members benefit from the services with their dependents (Hsiao, 2007). Job-
based health insurance generally works with group ratings and includes almost all the other 
features of individual private insurance but limits cherry-picking though it only captures 
people working in the formal private sector. 
In reality, market-based schemes can be unaffordable for the majority of the population. In 
fact, the private insurance markets fail because of adverse selection and moral hazard. The 
poor may not have access to health care, while wealthy individuals subscribe to insurance 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000; Diamond, 1992). As a result, income-related cross-subsidies 
between groups of different socioeconomic status are impossible and health-care needs may 
be unmet (McIntyre et al., 2008). It is not surprising that these schemes cover a very small 
share of the population in Low and Middle Income Countries (LMIC). 
11 This section is from Gnamon PhD Thesis (forthcoming) 




                                                     
2. Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) or Mutual Health 
Insurance (MHI) 
CBHI schemes appear to reduce the financial burden and the loss due to sickness episodes 
(Dror & Jacquier, 1999) in LMICs. Still, the poorest of the poor may continue to be excluded 
(Gilson et al., 2000; Jutting, 2004) while moral hazard and adverse selection can arise. MHI 
schemes can only achieve a minimal pooling of risks due to their small size and the fact that 
membership is voluntary (GTZ, 2005). Besides, financial and managerial difficulties may 
arise, such that the overall sustainability of CBHI is not always assured (Atim, 1998; Bennett, 
Creese, & Monash, 1998; Criel, 1998). Finally, they sometimes strongly rely on subsidies and 
absolutely need the partnership of quality health care providers to be attractive and 
credible. 
3. Medical saving accounts: 
According to the WHO (2012), Medical savings accounts (MSA) can be defined as savings 
accounts designated for out-of-pocket medical expenses. Both employers and individuals 
contribute to an MSA on a pre-tax basis. Kanchan et al. (2012) highlighted that these 
earmarked saving accounts usually have an attached high deductible and low premium 
catastrophic insurance plan (Backup financial mechanism). They have been introduced in 
response to private health insurance market drawbacks in order to:  
• Encourage savings for the expected high costs of medical care14;  
• Enlist health care consumers in controlling costs and then reduce both the spending 
born by a third-party (private or public health insurer);  
• Mobilize additional funds for health systems (Thomson and Mossialos, 2008 and 
Hanvoravongchai, 2012), and 
• Increase cost effectiveness of provided health care services. 
MSAs however display also some drawbacks. They indeed are sensitive to the business cycle 
as they represent an asset of the portfolio15. In addition, their existence may reinforce cream 
14 MSAs present the advantage that unused balances and earnings are allowed to be accumulated for use in a 
future year, unlike with Flexible Spending Account (FSA) and lower the financial burden on the youth and the 
employed. In fact, MSAs are tax-sheltered and are believed to reduce the amount of OOP from the individual 
(or household) at the moment the health shock occurs 
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skimming by the private health insurers16. Besides, this system is not affordable or useful for 
very low income or very sick individuals (Hanvoravongchai, 2002). Finally, MSAs do not allow 
for risk pooling across individuals; they favor eviction from the health insurance markets and 
they still require OOP payments through a high deductible. It is important to note that MSAs 
are not widely used in Africa. 
Hence, market-based health insurance schemes and MSAs do not promote equity and access 
to health care. Sustainability is generally not a major issue in the sense that scheme 
administrator fix the price of their services accordingly. CBHIs reduce inequities but can have 
governance and sustainability issues. 
B. Public initiatives 
Social health insurance (SHI) and National insurance which is funded by a tax-based (TB) 
system are public initiatives17. 
1. Social health insurance (SHI) 
Social health insurance schemes are generally understood as health insurance schemes 
provided by governments to its citizens, especially to low and middle income populations 
(Acharya et al., YEAR). In social health insurance, contributions from workers, self-employed, 
enterprises and government are pooled into a single fund or multiple funds on a compulsory 
basis (Hsiao, 2007). Preventive and public health care may be provided by these funds or 
responsibility kept solely by the Ministry of Health (WHO 2012).  
It is a scheme with mandatory participation and that allows a high level of risk pooling. It is 
believed to improve access to health care by reducing the OOP costs of health care (Monheit 
and Cunningham, 1992), especially because contributions are made on the pay as you earn 
principle. Free riding18 is limited under this scheme since contributions are taken at source. 
It however presents the disadvantage to target workers of the formal sector.  
2. Tax-based financing (TB) scheme 
15 See glossary for definition 
16 MSAs may not be affordable for medium and lower income individuals. However, they can be presented as 
condition to obtain a health insurance policy 
17 Bennett, S., & Gilson, L. (2000), Savedoff, W. D. (2004) and Wagstaff, A. (2009). 
18 See glossary for definition 
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The government has another alternative to provide for health insurance to its citizens: a 
national insurance scheme funded by a tax-based financed system. In this scheme, 
individuals contribute to the provision of health services through taxes on income, 
purchases, property, capital gains, and a variety of other items and activities. Health care 
costs are paid on the budget of the state and are typically pooled across the whole 
population, unless local governments raise and retain tax revenues. Health services are 
purchased by government, usually from a mix of public and private providers (WHO, 2012). 
In this sense, access to health care is increased, risk is more easily pooled and OOP 
considerably reduced. However, it is difficult to assess the extent to which contribution are 
equitable since they come from various taxation sources. A free rider problem can be 
noticed with some individuals not paying their taxes and yet beneficiating from public supply 
of health care. 
Public health insurance schemes (SHI or TB) can also be limited by over-insurance19 and 
moral hazard problems (Castano and Zambrano, 2006). This can then lead to waste and to a 
sustainability problem. In addition, co-payment requirements can raise concern about 
fairness, as in the case of the National Health Insurance plan in Taiwan (Ho, 2007). The 
economic literature has besides shown the existence of a crowding out effect, that is, the 
introduction of public health insurance, draws people who were previously covered by 
private health insurance, instead of the targeted population which is the poor. Inequities 
may be difficult to erase if this situation occurs. 
3. Innovative mechanisms (WHO, 2012) 
Besides those classic financing schemes, it is important to find innovative mechanisms, in a 
context of a rising demand for health care services, escalating costs of care, rapid increases 
in technology and a small fiscal space. Some of these methods are nationally based, such as 
hypothecated taxes, e.g. 'sin taxes' for tobacco and alcohol as well as national and state 
lotteries dedicated to health public-private partnerships to co-fund health care. Other 
mechanisms are internationally focused20. There are also other options that may be used to 
19 Idem 
20 Some of the internationally focused mechanisms are: 
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complement health financing mechanisms, e.g. conditional cash transfers, micro-banking or 
health vouchers. Such mechanisms can provide supplementary funds and potentially 
improve equity. By improving also the financial sustainability of the scheme, they can allow 
to broaden the benefit package or the population covered.  
Health vouchers 
Health vouchers are used in some countries as a way to provide in-kind transfer for health 
service utilization. A voucher is a subsidized card that entitles a pregnant woman to 
antenatal visits, assisted baby delivery including any complications, and a postnatal visit at 
her choice of qualified facility. They are currently used in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda especially for reproductive health (RHVouchers, 2013)21. Since it is a 
recent initiative, documented and quantitative studies on their use are few. However, it is 
possible to say that vouchers improve equity and access because are priced for and 
marketed to poor people in urban slums and rural areas (while social health insurance 
schemes cannot guarantee easy access for those who do not have transportation or who 
lack knowledge of how to utilize available services, vouchers.). 
All the alternatives to fund health systems present drawbacks and advantages. Most of them 
may end up with under-coverage because of the existence of exclusion (Cf. Table I.). Only 
public health insurance schemes have high risk pooling and low OOP for individuals, so that 
exclusion is low. According to Schremmer et al. (2009), compulsory social security schemes, 
compared to CBHIs, have the advantage of offering a comprehensive and relatively 
standardized benefit package, to increase redistribution (while in CBHIs, there is minimal 
redistributions), to have sophisticated computerized management processes and good 
administrative procedures and to offer a strong purchasing power for health services. 
1) The International Finance Facility (IFF). It consists in selling government bonds secured by future aids 
flows debt for health swaps, in which external government debt is converted into domestic debt;  
2) A debt-for-health swap and, 
3) The use of public-private partnerships to develop new products using capital markets. 
21 Filling the Health Equity Gap: How voucher programs deliver where social health insurance schemes may not 
Research Findings | February 27th, 2012. http://www.rhvouchers.org/research/2012/filling-the-health-equity-




                                                                                                                                                                      
Therefore, equity is better addressed by public health insurance schemes, while governance 
and sustainability needs to be optimized to increase adhesion to the schemes. 
It is worth noting that there is the possibility of creating hybrid schemes. Within the 
framework of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), both private interests and the public sector 
may intervene in funding and running a public health insurance scheme. Health care systems 
reform in industrialized countries has resulted in a shift from publicly financed systems to 
mixed ones. They also display significant patient co-payments for services (Besley and 
Gouveia, 1994; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997). In Ghana, the National Health Insurance scheme is 
a mix of tax-based (VAT) system and CBHI (at a district level). 
Section II: SITUATION OF HEALTH FINANCING IN WEST AFRICA 
This section undergoes a critical analysis of the current situation in West Africa, by pointing 
out challenges and opportunities. 
A. Situation in francophone West Africa 
As mentioned earlier, the current health care financing systems in West Africa, except for a 
few countries (with implemented universal coverage schemes) do not promote risk pooling 
and they consequently expose the poor to financial risk.  
In most of the francophone West African countries, health financing is a taxed-based system 
whereby the government (supported by donors and NGOs) allocates funds to the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) with a very low degree of coverage of private health insurance. Initially, only 
Cote d’Ivoire had an operational health insurance scheme for civil servant. In Benin, Niger 
and Togo, they are prepared as part of the universal health insurance scheme (See Table 
1)22. Most of the countries have a social security schemes for formal private sector 
employees. However, in most of the countries (except Cote d’Ivoire but especially in 
Senegal), there are a high number of mutual health insurance organizations. Table 1 
presents a summary of the schemes in the countries. 
22 Projects of establishing a Mutual for Civil Servants exist, but are not implemented in Senegal (2013).. The 
other countries don’t have such a scheme and have not planned it yet (Faye, 2010). 
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1. Strategies to reduce the financial burden of health care for poor 
populations 
In the absence of a national framework for risk pooling, the MoHs and some NGOs have 
developed strategies to reduce the financial burden of illness for the population, especially 
the poor, in such a way that the incidence of some diseases and mortality factors may be 
reduced. 
Governments have progressively organized fee exemption or subsidization for certain 
diseases and conditions such as Leprosy, Buruli Ulcer, Tuberculosis, Malaria, , even harelip, 
Guinea Worm and snake bites (See Annex 1 &2 for details on each country). In addition, 
voluntary HIV tests and ARVs are free. Some countries have instituted free/subsidized 
maternal and under 5 health care, caesarian sections and other obstetrical conditions 
requiring surgery such as fistula. Extended Programs on Immunization (EPI) are also used to 
provide free or subsidized immunization to children under 5 and mothers. Finally, in some 
public hospitals, there is free/subsidized care for some groups of the population such as the 
poor and students, subject to claim and administrative acceptance of exemption criteria. 
Senegal in particular, has a policy of reimbursement of care and drugs for people over 60 
through the Sesame Program. Subsidized/ free care is also used by NGOs to support the 
population. This will be discussed further in the section on main players in health financing. 
Besides all these strategies, and as a result of pressure from donors, Performance-based 
financing is a growing concept that is included in National Health Plan of some countries. It is 
a reward or incentive based approach (Canavan, Toonen and Elovainio, 2008) whose basic 
principle is “the money follows the patient”. If health facilities attract more patients and 
provide quality services they will receive more subsidies and incentive payments on a 
scheduled basis (monthly, quarterly or bi-annually). It is believed to be particularly relevant 
in fragile post-conflict contexts. Objectives of payment schemes include cost containment to 
rationalize the utilization of inputs (sustainability) and transformation of clinical practice 
towards improved quality of healthcare. PBF is therefore deployed as a modality to 
incentivize public and private providers, using different contract arrangements as informed 
by lessons learned from global and local context.  
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It however raises concerns relative to23: distortion of priorities of national health systems 
due to the targeting of services (Ireland et al. 2011; Scheffler, 2010); ‘gaming’ or false 
reporting of results and ‘cherry-picking’ of patients by health care workers (Ireland et al. 
2011; Kalk, 2011); rise of ‘perverse incentives’ (Fryatt et al. 2010); focus on quantity over 
quality of service (Ireland et al. 2011; Langenbrunner and Liu, 2005); perpetuation of 
inequity as areas where health systems are particularly underdeveloped (and thus unlikely to 
reach outcome targets) might be overlooked for funding (Ireland et al. 2011); and carry 
debilitating hidden costs due to the resources needed to establish PBF systems and 
monitoring mechanisms (Kalk, 2011). One specific concern raised by multiple studies is the 
impact that PBF might have on the intrinsic motivation of health care workers (Eijkenaar et 
al. 2013; Ireland et al. 2011; Kalk, 2011; Langenbrunner and Liu, 2005). Thin fact, financial 
incentives might crowd out the high levels of idealism in the health sector, thus leading to 
de-motivation of health-care workers. (Brown et al., 2013). Finally, it doesn’t directly address 
equity in access to health care by targeting specific population groups with special attention 
to the poor and vulnerable (Canavan, Toonen and Elovainio, 2008). In a study in 2012, 
Fretheim et al. concluded that no general conclusion can be drawn regarding the likely 
impact of performance-based financing in low-and middle-income countries.  
2. Movement towards universal coverage 
Almost all the francophone West African countries have demonstrated the will and desire to 
move towards universal health insurance schemes. Over the past three years, some 
countries have already launched the process of establishing such a scheme while in others, 
the project is still at an embryonic level. This sub-section provides an overview of the 
challenges and the opportunities for each group of countries. 
Most of the countries have passed it in law and/or officially launched the scheme, or well 
advanced in preparations after receiving the support of the WHO (P4H Social Protection 
Network) in the designing of the scheme24. It is only in Guinea that there is no deliberate 
23 This section is from Brown et al.. (2013). 





                                                     
political will to introduce such a scheme. Table 1 depicts the status of National health 
insurance scheme in francophone West Africa. 
In Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger the universal health insurance is still under study with 
ongoing consultations to prepare for it.  
In Senegal, a scheme is operational since 2009 and is currently tested in five health districts 
(out of twelve) with the support of the Agence Belge de Developpment (CTB)25. The Régime 
d’Assurance Maladie Universelle (RAMU) was launched in Benin in December 2011 by 
President Boni Yayi, but has not been fully implemented. In Togo, the Institut National 
d’Assurance Maladie (INAM) is operational since 2012 but only covers civil servants up to 
now. Finally, in Mali, the Régime d’Assurance Maladie Obligatoire (RAMO) is also operational 
since 2011 Several challenges have been emphasized by studies, including governance, 
clarification of the role of each actor, identification of the poor and benefit package design. 
Cote d’Ivoire is a particular case where the scheme was passed into law in 2001 and the 
Conférence Interafricaine de la Prévoyance Sociale (CIPRES) in a 2010 study classified the 
country as being in the final phase of designing the project. However, there was no 
implementation due to a decade of political crisis with three major shocks (2002, 2004 and 
2010-2011). Presently, free health care is only available for mothers and children under six. 
Very recently, the Minister of Employment and Social Affairs announced 26 a new universal 
health coverage scheme called Couverture Maladie Universelle to be launched by the end of 
2013 or in 2014. Consultations will soon begin to design the whole scheme. 
The challenges for such systems will undoubtedly be the responsiveness of the health care 
supply to an increased demand subsequent to the reduction (or elimination) of financial 
barriers. In the Ivorian case, lack of infrastructure, equipment, drugs and personnel was 
pointed out during the free health care program initiated by the Ivorian government from 
May 2011 to January 2012. In addition, doctors were overwhelmed by a tremendous rise in 
consultations (Ouattara, Houngbedji and Koudou, 2013). However in Niger, Ridde, Queuille 
25 Source: http://www.btcctb.org/fr/casestudy/nouveau-mod%C3%A8le-d%E2%80%99assurance-maladie-
universelle-test%C3%A9-cinq-districts-sanitaires-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal  
26 Source : http://www.guineeeconomie.com/news_fiche.php?id=636  
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and Kafando (2012) noted that free care didn’t worsen the workload of health 
professionnals. 
Most of the existing plans on universal health coverage in West Africa (except in Cote 
d’Ivoire) have been built by combining strengthened mutual health insurance schemes and a 
compulsory health insurance for formal workers (Togo, Mali, Benin). In Benin, Cote d’Ivoire 
and Mali a sub-component of the scheme covers the needy (See Table 1). 
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Table 1 : Social security schemes in francophone West Africa and Ghana 
 
 






Status of NHI Social security Mutual for civil 
servants
Other formal workers' mutuals CBHIs
Benin
Réseau d'Assurance Maladie 
Universelle (RAMU) 
Fonds National pour 




MUTUELLE DE SECURITE SOCIALE; 
Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale 
(CNSS),Fonds National des Retraités 
du Bénin (FNRB)
MSAE : Mutuelle de 
Santé des Agents de 
l'Etat (as a component of 
RAMU) FSPA, FNRB
Mutuelle de Sécurité Sociale (MSS) 
Union Communales des Mutuelles de 
Santé  Réseau de Mutuelles de Santé 







be launched in 
2015
Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale - 
CNSS
La fédération des mutuelles professionnelles 
Union des mutuelles de santé du 
Centre (UMUSAC); 200 les mutuelles 








as part of AMU
TERMINAL PHASE 
OF STUDY- PILOT 
PHASES TO BE 
LAUNCHED IN 
LATE 2013 OR 
2014
Caisse Nationale de Prevoyance 
Sociale (CNPS-for formal private 
sector) Caisse Generale de Retraite 
des Agents de l'Etat (CGRAE-public 
servants)
Mutuelle Generale des 
Fonctionnaires de Cote 
d'Ivoire (MUGEFCI)
la MA-CNPS (Mutuelle des Agents de la CNPS), LE FPPN (Fonds de Prévoyance 
de la Police Nationale), le FPM (Fonds de  Prévoyance Militaire), la MUMADGI 
(Mutuelle des Agents de la Direction Générale des Impôts), la  MUSA-ANADER 
(Mutuelle des Agents de l’ANADER), la Mutuelle des Agents du CNRA, la 
Mutuelle des Agents de Palamfrique, CAMES/CIP, LA MUTREP-CI (Mutuelle des 
Travailleurs et Retraités du Secteur Privé de Côte d’Ivoire)
Low
Guinea NONE NONE NONE CNSS 
(MURIGA; Union des Mutuelles de 
Santé de Guinée Forestière 
EMUFOUD (Réseau des Mutuelles du 





Social Security and National 
Insurance Trust (SSNIT)- 1972 ; Global 
Social Trust, a pilot project for social 
protection for informal sector adnd 
vulnerable population
Civil Servants Health 
Care Scheme affiliated 
to the NHIS after 2005
Mali







INPS l’INPS, la Caisse Malienne de 
Sécurité Sociale (CMSS) et de l’Union 
Technique
de la Mutualité (UTM)
Assurance Maladies Mutualiste (For 
each sector and each estate)
Mauritania
A supplementary health 
insurance scheme 
(couverture maladie 
supplémentaire) run by 
CNAM and opened to all 
citizens is in preparation
? UNDER STUDY 
Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale 





Mutuelle Communautaire de Sante 




Maladie volontaire et des 
Mutuelles de Santé dans le 
cadre du projet
? UNDER STUDY 
Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale 
(CNSS); Caisse Autonome de Retraite 
du Niger (CARENI)
In creation but 80% of 
health spending from 
civil servants are paid by 
the government
Mutuelles (entreprises et milieu rural)
MUTUELLE ALFURMA Mutuelle de 
Santé "Tounda- Hiney"  
Senegal Universal Health Insurance
OPERATIONAL 
SINCE 2009, PILOT 
STUDY IN 2013
Social Security Fund
Mutuelle de Sante des 
Agents de l'Etat (MSAE)
Mutuelle des Volontaires et Contractuels de l'Education (MVCE);  Union des 
Mutuelles du Partenariat pour la Mobilisation de l'Epargne et le Crédit (UM-
PAMECAS) UMS (Union des Mutuelles du Senegal ); Mutuelle Sociale Transvie
Togo
Institut National d'Assurance 
Maladie - INAM (2012)
? UNDER STUDY 
la Caisse de Retraite du Togo (CRT) 
pour les agents du secteur public et 
la Caisse Nationale de Sécurité 
Sociale (CNSS)




Several studies have demonstrated that the existence of a third-party payer (hence 
subsidized or free health care) shifts the demand for health care curve and results in higher 
use of health care services. The implementation of exemptions policies in various 
Francophone WA countries has shown that in these settings, some challenges exist to scale 
up quality and quantity of health care provided27. They are related to the current 
organization of the health care system. Some of them are: 
• Lack of personnel, drugs (and other medical goods) and infrastructure (hospital, 
health centers) to satisfy the demand; 
• Worsened working conditions for healthcare providers; 
• Low financial incentives for health care professionals to work more or better and to 
ensure the success of the policies; 
• Policy relies heavily on external and not internal funding; 
• Rigidity and centralization in reimbursement procedures from the government’s side 
with in delays of payments from the government, raising issues around the financial 
sustainability at the local level site of service delivery ; 
• Lack of transparency in the amount to be paid by the government; 
• Some of the policies are too general and fail to effectively target and identity the 
needy; 
• Isolated policy that doesn’t take into account other determinants of health care 
utilization; 
• Low capacity of evaluation of the functioning and impact of the policies, and 
• Poor integration into the health system hindered implementation of the policies, and 
• Dysfunctions in governance of funds and management of personnel. 
These challenges must be considered in effectively establishing Universal Health Care (UHC). 
Both supply (quality) and demand-side (financial protection) issues must be addressed by 
UHC schemes. Besides, the choice of combining mutual health insurance schemes and 
mandatory formal sector insurance can be explained by the fact that poverty and 
informalization of the economies are prominent in these countries. It could be difficult to 
collect contributions from the informal sector. It is seldom to find relevant and updated 
27 Ridde, Queuille. et Kafando (2012) ; All other things on personnel in Cote d’Ivoire et al!!!!; Project Results 
105309 (IDRC document). 
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information on income levels in this sector. Using a proportional tax can be difficult to 
implement and can generate free riding or prevent individuals to enter or remain in the 
system. For this reason, most plans are built in such a way that contributions of the informal 
sector (including a great share of agriculture) are lump sum payments but direct taxes are 
used to collect contributions for formal sector employees and pensioners. In the case of 
developing countries, it appears however a second best solution because of free-riding and 
opting out. In Benin however, the RAMU suggests a lump sum contribution for the entire 
population. Levying a lump sum can raise equity issues in term of tax incidence. Most of the 
time, this practice is regressive. It can put a heavier burden on the poorer and reduced the 
ability of the system to collect as much resource as available28.  
4. Main players in health financing 
Apart from the governments, some NGOs and international donors’ actions are crucial in 
financing the current strategies to reduce the burden of health care for the populations. The 
Global Fund against Malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis finances subsidization or exemption 
of fees for treatment including ARVs. The GAVI alliance is also a strong partner in providing 
immunization especially for the EPIs, while the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is highly 
involved in immunization and mosquito nets distribution. NGOs are also active in 
subsidization or exemption of fees; for example, the Raoul Follereaux Foundation in the case 
of leprosy. A study on capitalization on user fees policies in West Africa (Ridde, Queuille et 
Kafando, 2012) has noted the following NGOS and actors in health financing:  
• ONG HELP, (hilfe zur selbsthilfe e.v.) 
• Médecins du Monde (MDM-Physicians of the world)  
• Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF -Physicians without borders) 
• Terre des Hommes (TDH) 
 
28 In most of the case the lump sum is low enough to be “bearable for poor households” and encourage taking 
up. In the case of Benin, it is 1,000 FCFA (approximately 2.07 $, as of the November 29, 2013) per person and 
per month. In so doing, the scheme collects less than what the tax base of wealthier individuals can allow to 




                                                     
B. Health financing in other settings 
This section presents health financing in African countries with an almost universal system 
(Ghana and Rwanda), as well as the case of South Africa. Some selected cases of successful 
reforms in Latin America and Asia are also reviewed in order to inform reform in 
francophone West Africa. 
1. Successful African countries 
This subsection presents the facts on three (3) African countries: Ghana, Rwanda and South 
Africa. Ghana represents the case of establishment of universal health coverage, Rwanda a 
successful implementation of Mutual health insurance scheme and South Africa a system 
dominated by private health insurance schemes.  
Ghana 
According to the WHO Global Health Expenditure Atlas, Ghana was the third country in West 
Africa with the lowest OOP share (29%) in health care financing in 2009 and 2010.The 
Ghanaian National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) is well-known in the Economic 
Community of West African States region. Starting from the early 1990s, Ghana began to 
seek other ways of financing health care, including NGO and initiated community-based 
health insurance schemes (CBHIs). While popular among members and international donors 
at the time, the schemes only targeted specific areas and were not supported by general 
government revenue to allow them to cater for the poor. The NHIS was established under 
Act 650 of 2003 by the Government to provide a broad range of health care services to 
Ghanaians through district mutual and private health insurance schemes (Blanchet, Fink and 
Osei-Akoto, 2012). The insurance became operational in 2005 and registration of the 
Ghanaian population increased from 18% in 2006 to 62% in 2009 and to 66.2% in 2010. As of 
2010, 54.5% of the registered population is under 18 years old and 32.6% are those working 
in the formal sector. 
The NHIS is funded through Value-Added Tax (VAT), social security deductions for formal 
sector workers and voluntary membership contributions by those outside the formal sector, 
with members obtaining care from accredited public or private health services. The indigent, 
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children under 18 years whose parents are enrolled and the aged (70 and +) are exempted 
from payment (Goudge et al., 2012). 
The effect of the NHIS on access to health care has been studied extensively. Witter and 
Garshong noted that the number of outpatient visits per capita in Ghana increased sharply 
after 2005, the same year NHIS operations began. Mensah et al found that pregnant women 
enrolled in the NHIS are more likely to receive prenatal care, give birth in a hospital, and 
have skilled attendants present at birth. Similar results were found in a recent study tracking 
health seeking behavior in two districts before and after NHIS rollout29. Finally, Blanchet et al 
(2012) found that on average, individuals enrolled in the insurance scheme are significantly 
more likely to obtain prescriptions, visit clinics and seek formal health care when sick. 
However, there exist some equity concerns about the new funding source (a VAT-based tax) 
which may be more regressive. In addition, membership of the NHIS at present is pro-rich 
and pro-urban biased concerning renewals. Some other challenges remain in relation to its 
accountability (Witter and Garshong, 2009). 
Rwanda 30 
Rwanda’s case is largely considered as a “success story” on extending health coverage 
especially because the country emerged from a very violent political crisis. After an 
unsuccessful attempt, the Government launched in 2001 a program to organize universal 
coverage through community health insurance (Musango, Doetinchem et Carrin, 2009) to 
cover those in informal and rural economies. Health system funding is then based on risk 
pooling organized through formal sector insurance and CBHIs as follows: 
(1) La Rwandaise d’assurance maladie (RAMA) which covers civil servants and their 
dependants instituted in 2001 and reformed in 2002; it covers a large range of 
medical services including ARVs31; 
29Blanchet et al, 2012. 
30This section heavily draws on http://www.issa.int/News-Events/News2/Rwanda-innovates-to-sustain-
universal-health-care-coverage  
31The contribution is 15% of the salary with 7.5% paid par the employer and 7.5% by the employee. The 
coinsurance rate is 85%. 
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(2) The Fonds d’appui aux rescapés du genocide (FARG) covers the victims of the 
genocide for a certain range of services, including health insurance32; 
(3) The « Medical Military Insurance » (MMI) is a compulsory scheme that covers all the 
soldiers33; 
(4) Private health insurance schemes which have existed since 2006 in Rwanda. They 
essentially target firms. In 2009, there were only three such schemes providing 
coverage to around 0.1 % of the Rwandese population. Premiums range between 100 
and 700 $ US per individual per year; 
(5) The Community Based Health insurance organized by the government; 
(6) A 100% coverage (sponsored by the government) for the inyangamugayo, individuals 
working in traditional courts on the genocide; 
(7) Free health care for prisoners , and 
(8) The Caisse sociale du Rwanda which is the national social security fund covering 
occupational health34 care and services. 
As a result, there was a rapid expansion of CBHI coverage and utilization of services by the 
population for the period 2003-2010 (See Annex 3), from 7% to 91% of the population, with 
a utilization rate rising from 31% to 95% in the same period of time.  
Nevertheless, there exist challenges concerning absence of data and accurate identification 
of poor households. In addition, low premiums can jeopardize the sustainability of the 
scheme which already has an increasing debt. A reform of CBHI management and 
monitoring is ongoing to correct these drawbacks.  
South Africa 
In South Africa, health care is financed through a combination of mechanisms but the most 
prominent is through private health insurance schemes. In 2005 for instance, allocations 
from general tax accounted for about 40%, private medical schemes about 45%, and OOP 
32Each civil servant contributes to 1% of his salary and 5% of the budget is given by the state and other 
voluntary gifts are used to finance the scheme. This scheme also covers for education costs and other social 
needs. 
33They pay 5% of their salary and the government contributes to 17% of their salary 
34Contribution are collected from the employer who pays 5% of the salary (3% for pensions and 2% for 
occupational risks) and from the employee (3%). 
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payments for about 14% of total health care financing (Ataguba and Akazili 2010). Ataguba 
and McIntyre in 2012 found that inequities exist in the South African health system. In 2005, 
for instance, general tax revenue (public finance), was used to cater for about 68% of the 
population dependent entirely on underfunded public facilities, and to subsidize care for the 
insured minority. Private insurance contributions only covered about 16% of the privately 
insured population who are the richest group (McIntyre et al. 2007)35 and from private 
health providers. 21% of the total population uses private primary care services on an OOP 
basis (McIntyre et al. 200736 and Mills et al, 2012). Besides, the public health system is 
overburdened by the volume of users and there are ongoing debates about the fairness of 
the distribution of resources between the public and private sectors relative to the 
population served by each (McIntyre et al. 200737; Ataguba and Akazili 2010). National and 
social health insurance has been hotly debated for many years as a possible mechanism to 
reduce inequity (Goudge et al, 2012). McIntyre and Ataguba 2012 using a simulation 
technique showed that extended private insurance schemes is the least progressive 
option38, would impose a very high payment burden on households and the option with the 
highest pro-rich distribution for public health care . 
It appears from the South African case that private health insurance expansion is not a 
solution in low-income settings from the demand-side. From the supply side, there is a need 
to scale-up capacities in the public health system. 
2. The Case of Latin American countries 
In Latin American countries, there are different schemes, but it is worth noting innovative 
schemes such as Colombia’s regulated competition model that provides universal coverage 
and has encouraged reforms in countries39. In Chile, the Acceso Universal de Garantías 
Explícitas AUGE Plan seeks universal coverage with a limited package and guaranteed 
waiting times, and Mexico’s Seguro Popular offers tax-financed coverage through social 
35Cited by Ataguba and McIntyre, 2012 
36 Cited by Goudge et al, 2012. 
37 Idem 
38 The paper investigates option to reach universal care in the country. The other options were universal 
coverage and status quo(keeping the current health system financing feature with 16% of private health 
insurance ). 
39 Dominican Republic and Peru 
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insurance covering the previously uninsured. While several countries contract private 
providers for their public schemes, all permit the private sector to sell services with limited 
regulation to those able to pay (Knaul et al, 2012). In this section, the Colombian and 
Mexican cases are presented. 
The Colombian case40: 
In 1993, Colombia initiated a process of health sector reform with the aim of achieving 
coverage for all Colombian citizens through a process of universal insurance. The new health 
system grants all Colombian citizens the benefits of a basic health service package along with 
the right to choose a private or public insurance provider. People with capacity to pay (CTP) 
are affiliated to the Contributory Health Insurance Scheme (Régimen Contributivo), and are 
registered with one of 40 Health Promoting Entities (Entidades Promotoras de Salud, EPS). 
Affiliation with an EPS requires payment of a monthly contribution equivalent to 12.5% of 
the worker’s income41, which confers access to an explicit benefits package covering the 
affiliate and his or her first-degree relatives. In exchange for their contribution, affiliates and 
their relatives receive an integral health service package known as the Compulsory Health 
Plan (Plan Obligatorio de Salud). If they wish, affiliates can purchase additional health 
insurance. Poor people42 are covered by the Subsidized Health Insurance Scheme (Régimen 
Subsidiado), and may register freely with any of the 49 EPS that operate under the 
subsidized scheme. The government covers the cost of the basic benefits package offered 
under this scheme. As of 2008, 49% of these costs were financed by transfers from the 
central government treasury, 24% by the solidarity fund financed mostly through a solidarity 
payroll tax contribution (1.5% of payroll), and the rest mainly by territorial (departmental 
and municipal) health sources (Ministry of Social Protection, 2009). According to the 
National Health Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Salud), in the year 2007, 78% of the 
population was covered by an insurance scheme, 46% of whom were covered by the 
subsidized scheme. By 2011, coverage reached 95% as noted above; 53% of whom were 
40 This section is from Knaul et al, 2012, Chapter 7. 
41 In the case of formal workers, 4 percent is contributed by the employee and 8 percent by the employer. 
Independent workers contribute the full 12 percent of their salary, starting from a floor of two minimum wages 
(around US$355 in 2006) (Pablo Gottret, George J. Schieber, and Hugh R. Waters, 2008). 
42 Defined as those who lack the CTP as identified by a proxy means test known as the System of Identification 
of Social Subsidies Beneficiaries (Sistema de Identificación de Beneficiarios, SISBEN) 
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covered under the subsidized scheme. The country recorded OOP of 22% in 2009 as a share 
of THE (WHO, 2011). Besides, insurance appears to be a fundamental variable for financial 
protection. 
However, it is only recently that benefits packages offered through the contributory and 
subsidized insurance schemes were equalized. In the past, only contributory scheme 
affiliates had a very complete package. There was then inequitable access to health care and 
some populations are still isolated from health care43. Deficiencies persist in capacity and 
quality of primary care and preventive medicine. Sustainability issues have been raised, 
along with quality of health outcomes, due to use of emergency care instead of primary 
health care44.  
A current health care system reform is in preparation with the support of the InterAmerican 
Development Bank to correct these drawbacks and assure more equitable access to quality 
services and greater efficiency in resource management. 
The Mexican case 
In Mexico, the government enforced in 2003 a law to create the Sistema de Protección Social 
en Salud (SPSS)45 and the “Seguro Popular” (SP) (Aracena-Genao et al, 2011) to ensure 
financial protection for the population out of the scope of existing social security 
institutions. This new system included the Fund for Protection against Catastrophic Expenses 
(FPGC). The social security schemes cover the Mexican Institute for Social Security (IMSS) 
and the Institute for Security and Social Services for Civil Servants (ISSSTE) cover only formal 
workers of the private and public sectors (Knaul et al, 2012-chapter 9). The creation of the 
SSPS and the launch of SP in 2004 involved a major legislative reform focused on financial 
reorganization and the commitment to increase funding for health by 1% of GDP, primarily 
through public resources. The mobilization of additional public resources for SP created the 
financial conditions necessary to expand the coverage of public health insurance in Mexico. 
The most recent data from the Ministry of Health (MOH) indicate that the number of SP 
43 InterAmerican Develpoment Bank (2013)  
44 Idem 
45 System for Social health Protection 
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affiliates reached 52.5 million in February 2012. The majority of SP affiliates belong to the 
poorest four income deciles and 35% live in rural communities (Knaul et al, 2012-chapter 9). 
In a study in 2011, Sosa-Rubí, Salinas-Rodríguez and Galárraga found that SP had no effect 
on catastrophic health expenditures at the local level.  However, at the household level, they 
found a protective effect of SP on catastrophic health expenditures and the OOP health 
payments in outpatient and hospitalization in rural areas; and a significant effect on the 
reduction of OOP health payments in outpatient services in urban zones.  
From 2004-2009 the FPGC increased its coverage from 6 to 49 interventions, that means a 
spending increase of 2,306.4% in nominal terms and 1,659.3% in real terms. The HIV/AIDS 
was the intervention prioritized with 39.3% and Mexico City had the highest proportion of 
expenditure (25.1%). A few diseases included in the health profile are covered by the FPGC 
(Aracena-Genao et al., 2011). 
An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development study shows that some 
challenges remain because of a narrow benefit package, low efficiency and quality of public 
providers, along with low governance. This study emphasizes the need to find additional 
funding sources to ensure sustainability of the system. 
3. The Case of Asian countries 
In Asia, specifically in South-East Asian countries, a certain number of countries 
implemented reforms to move towards universal health coverage. The cases of Thailand and 
Sri Lanka are presented. 
Thailand46 
Thailand has three organized schemes for universal health coverage running with private 
health insurance schemes: 
(1) The Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSBMS): It covers civil servants, public 
employees and their dependents. The scheme is paid totally from general tax 
46 This section is from Pablo Gottret, George J. Schieber, and Hugh R. Waters, (2008). 
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revenue, based on a fee-for-service retrospective reimbursement system. Public 
facilities are the main providers under this scheme. 
(2) The Social Security Scheme (SSS):  The SSS is a tripartite system, funded by equal-
share contributions by employers, employees, and the government. It covers private 
employees and temporary public employees. The insurees are about equally 
distributed between public and private facilities. This scheme pays the providers 
under a contract capitation system. 
(3) Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS or the “30 Baht Scheme”): Universal health 
insurance coverage, since October 2001, has combined the previous Medical Welfare 
Scheme and the Voluntary Health Card Scheme, further expanding coverage to 18 
million more people. This scheme covers 74.6 percent of the population  with a 
comprehensive package of care, including both curative and preventive care. It is 
financed solely from general tax revenue. Public hospitals are the main providers, 
covering more than 95 percent of the insured. About 60 private hospitals joined the 
system and register around 4 percent of the beneficiaries. After the new government 
assumed office in October 2006, the B 30 copayment was abolished, and the system 
is now totally free of charge. In addition, since October 2003, the government has 
also embarked on universal access of ARV.  
The country recorded that the number of outpatient visits in all public hospitals in 2003 
increased between 40 and 50 percent (Pachanee and Wibulpolprasert 2006). However, some 
people buy specific health insurance. Their coverage is quite low usually less than 2 percent 
of the population. 
Some challenges regarding an increase in workload and dissatisfaction of health personnel, 
adverse effects of resource allocation reform and financial sustainability exist. It is however 
believed that this universal health care access is a success, because of the near-
disappearance of uninsured47, the significant reduction of the catastrophic illnesses and out-
of-pocket health expense as well as poverty reduction, consumer satisfaction, the expansion 
47The number of uninsured has dramatically decreased from 20 percent of the total population in 1998 to 2 
percent in 2007 (table 12.8) (NHSO 2007a). Coverage is then assumed to be universal  
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of the benefit package, the strengthening of the capacity for knowledge generation and 
management, and the strong public involvement and support. 
Sri Lanka48 
In Sri Lanka, public sector health spending is financed exclusively from general tax revenue, 
with a small contribution from international development assistance (less than 5 percent). 
There is no social insurance. A fifth of private financing is from employer spending on 
medical benefit schemes for their employees and on group medical insurance schemes, plus 
a smaller amount from individually purchased medical insurance. 
However, all government health services, with few exceptions, are available free to all 
citizens, including all inpatient, outpatient, and community health services. Free services 
range from ARVs for HIV/AIDS patients to coronary bypass surgery. Access to all services is 
reinforced by a policy of permitting patients to visit any hospital in the country without 
restriction, and with no enforcement of a referral system. The government is able to do this 
because of a high level of technical efficiency in its delivery system, which keeps costs low, 
and the implicit strategy of encouraging the richer patients not to burden the government 
health system by voluntarily opting to use private providers.  
Section III: HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND RESEARCH 
This section presents some results of IDRC-funded projects on health financing and the gaps 
identified in the literature. 
A. Health financing system research in IDRC projects: key 
lessons 
Health financing and extension of coverage to poor and / or people in the informal sector 
have been the focus of recent projects financed by the GEHS program.  
Three projects were run in the context of public policy and protection from exclusion. The 
first one found that reducing the gap between subscriber and promoter expectations may 
48This section is from Pablo Gottret, George. Schieber, Hugh and Waters (2008). 
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help increase enrolment in, and performance of CBHIs49. The second one evaluated the 
criteria for selection of indigents in public hospitals. It was found that in Cote d’Ivoire, 
selection of indigents by health practitioners was subjective and not done on the basis of a 
set of defined criteria. In Burkina Faso, exemption for obstetrical emergencies was found not 
to be well designed, meaning that poor women couldn’t have access to designated services. 
Following the research, the Hospital management reformulated the exemption policy. 
Finally, in Senegal, barriers on participation in mutual health insurance schemes and access 
to health care were identified for a better coverage of people in the informal sector.  
Another study in Burkina Faso suggested an alternative to fuzzy identification of indigents. It 
particularly focused on the selection process and the viability of community exemption from 
payment, comparing three interventions (one state-led and two communities led). It 
concluded that community-based targeting was better accepted by the stakeholders than 
was the State-led intervention. The strengths of the community-based approach were a 
clear definition of selection criteria, information of the waiver beneficiaries and use of a 
participative process and endogenous funding. However, the weakness was the fact 
endogenous funding led to restrictive selection by the community. The system needs to be 
improved and retested to generate more knowledge before scaling up. 
Another project analyzing user fees exemptions in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger examined 
the effect of these policies implemented by the governments. Generally, it has been found 
that they led to improvement in diagnoses and treatment of morbidity. However, several 
caveats were highlighted, related to financial and organizational dysfunctions which 
negatively impacted healthcare quality, along with lack of technical and budgetary 
preparation. It is worth noting that except in Burkina Faso, working condition of health 
workers were worsened by the policy. 
An ongoing project in Niger studies the neglected issues in the health sector and looks at 
their impact on access to health care. It addresses issues like quality of care by examining 
the impact of midwife’s malpractice on demand for prenatal care. 
49 Ouimet et al, 2007 
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These IDRC projects have addressed some of the key debates on extending health coverage 
but some questions remain. Among them, it is possible to cite:  
• How can indigents and the poor be effectively identified at a national level? 
• How do we effectively and equitably collect contributions from the informal sector? 
• Will a levy of (supplementary) taxes have effects on the macroeconomic level 
(unemployment, consumption, etc.)? 
• Is universal health insurance sustainable without donors’ involvement? 
B. Gaps identified and future research 
Very little is known about the existing financing system and the prospect of new alternative 
systems and several gaps can be identified in the literature concerning health financing 
systems in West Africa. Some of them are general gaps related to availability of data. Other 
gaps related to the fact that there is over-insurance, underinsurance and sustainability of 
insurance schemes. Finally, there also exist gaps on the trade-off between better access to 
health care (equity) and quality of care (governance and efficiency). 
1. Gaps related to data availability and management 
There is generally a lack of data and poor management of existing ones. Information on 
current organisation of health care financing is not available. There is no data repository on 
existing health care financing schemes in West Africa. In reality, National health accounts are 
not systematically produced in the countries in such a way that data on health spending is 
compiled and analysed on a regular basis (Annex 4). 
Data need to be built around utilization and expenditure patterns and costs of health care 
services, especially in the case of existing health insurance schemes. In the case of utilization 
and expenditure, data exist in private and mutual health insurance scheme but are not 
available to researchers for use. Data on health care cost and Medical CPI is lacking. It needs 
to be collected at health center, district and national level. Besides, data on perception of 
health care quality is lacking. 
Hence, there is a need to create research departments in MoHs. With the availability of data, 
studies will be feasible, and can analyze:  
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• The existence of moral hazard and physician-induced demand on health care in West 
African countries;  
• The determinants and dynamics of drug consumption (Agence Nationale des 
Statistiques et de la Démographie WHO (2012, Rapport d’analyse des dépenses 
catastrophiques de sante et leur impact sur l’appauvrissement et l’utilisation des 
services au Sénégal 2005 & 2011, Sénégal.) 
• Computation and assessment of the Medical CPI in Africa to explain the increase of 
medical care costs and the major components of this increase because universal 
coverage systems may be threatened by it; 
• Methodological costing of alternative strategies for universal coverage in the 
countries; 
2. Gaps related to over-insurance and underinsurance 
Some gaps needs to be filled to investigated the extent of over-insurance (of a low share of 
the population) in West African countries and how this could affect take up rate, utilization 
of care and sustainability in a universal health insurance scheme. Studies on over-insurance 
investigate the existence of physician-induced demand and moral hazard. In addition, 
underinsurance (of the majority of the population) and determinants of health care have to 
be more investigating, comparing health care seeking behaviour by insurance status. Studies 
could examine: 
• Criteria for selection of drugs into health insurance schemes; 
• Extensive studies on the impact, the benefits of patronizing to existing health 
insurance schemes; 
• The drivers of medical expenses; 
• Health insurance holding and health seeking behaviour, and 
• Physician-induced demand in private health insurance scheme. 
 
3. Gaps related to access and quality of care 
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As shown in some other studies50, current health systems in francophone countries may be 
overstretched and question may rise concerning the quality of care in a context of increased 
access to health care. It is then important to analyze the following issues: 
• The extent and magnitude of neglected issues in health care such as midwifes’ 
practices51; 
• The perceived quality of care by patients, especially in public facilities 
• The determinants of “quality” care, especially in public facilities 
• The prerequisite in terms of quantity and quality of (public) health care for universal 
coverage: what is required supply to satisfy the demand generated from releasing 
financial barriers to health care? 
4. Gaps related to the design of universal health scheme 
Planning and organizing universal health coverage needs to be based on studies. There is a 
need to invest in exploring the following issues: 
• Scoping studies, literature reviews and state of knowledge in health care financing in 
West Africa : such studies exist for east and southern Africa, Nigeria and Ghana, but 
not for francophone West African countries; 
• What are the costs, benefits and feasibility of unifying the public health insurance 
schemes in one plan? What are the magnitude, causes and costs of health insurance 
coverage duplication? 
• How can we develop cost containment strategies that do not reduce utilization of 
health care for the needy? 
• Setting priorities studies: such studies undertaken by Alliance don’t include52 
francophone West Africa countries; 
• Functioning and sustainability of existing health care financing schemes in West 
Africa; 
50Such as Ridde, Queuille and Kafando (2012). 
51 This question is addressed in the case of Niger in an IDRC funded and ongoing study 
52 Ranson M. K., Law T. J., Bennett S.(2008), Establishing health system financing research priorities in 
developing countries using a participatory methodology, Alliance for health research, WHO. 
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• There is no evidence (financial or actuarial projections) that the future planned 
universal coverage or mutual health insurance systems can draw on? To predict 
sustainability? , and 
• What is the socially desirable benefit package? 
Aside from these gaps, there is a need to elicit some other questions such as health financing 
schemes in the context of a fragile state, since a certain number of countries experienced or 
are experiencing wars and political crises. Besides, it is worth noting that very few active 
research groups on health systems research, social and medical sciences, public health or 
health economics are undertaking regional studies or providing materials and studies in 
francophone West Africa. 
There is a need to fill research gaps, provide data and feed in the debates on equity VS 
quality of care, equity VS sustainability, governance and equity to promote evidence and 





Section IV: CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
In francophone West Africa, risk pooling is very low and current health financing systems 
involve high spending from the population. Although universal coverage is envisioned in 
almost all the countries, the resulting plans and laws, in most of the cases, are not clear 
about the way resources will be collected, who will benefit and what is the content of the 
benefit package. It is true that some studies show that CBHIs have a good potential of 
working in LMICs, but there is a need to build a national pool to ensure both equity in access 
and sustainability of the scheme. In Ghana, expanding CBHIs didn’t work while it is 
considered as a success in Rwanda. 
These schemes need to be built on the basis of lessons learned from other countries, by 
paying attention to both the supply-side (by scaling up quality, efficiency and governance 
especially from public providers) and the demand-side (by building contribution scheme and 
benefit package that can increase access to care especially for the poorest). The examples 
from the world suggest that: 
(1) There is a possibility of having high technical efficiency in health care supply by the 
public sector (Sri Lanka) ; 
(2)  The expansion of private health insurance schemes is not a solution for achieving 
universal coverage (South Africa) ; 
(3)  It is possible to find an objective way to identify poor that will beneficiate from 
exemption (Colombia); 
(4) Universal coverage brings the challenge of financial sustainability regardless of the 
modality used (mutual health insurance or social health insurance scheme), 
(Colombia, Ghana, Mexico, Rwanda and Thailand) and 
(5)  Medical staff’s working conditions have to be considered in organizing universal 
coverage for the success of the scheme (Cote d’Ivoire, Mali). The case of Niger shows 
that there is a possibility to increase access to health care and keep reasonable 
workload. 
Universal coverage will not happen overnight. It also requires a better organization of the 
health information systems so as to collect and analyze data actively to have a better 
understanding of the whole system. Governance can also encourage quality of care and 
34 
 
increase population’s adhesion and participation to the scheme. Ensuring good quality of 
care means that equipment, medical goods and infrastructure are available, as well as 
enough health practitioners. Besides, prerequisites for the success of universal health 
coverage go beyond the health sector and can concern the organization of the economy. 
Informalization reduces the chances of having progressive contributions by obliging to 
collect lump sum taxes because incomes are unobservable. 
Finally, each country has a special context that necessitates rigorous investigations to 
determine the optimal path to universal coverage. 
The last WHO report clearly shows that universal coverage has to rely on research, quality 
research is essential in the rush for universal coverage. There is a need to conduct massive 
research to inform decision-making in this respect. This is especially important because 
financial sustainability of the scheme is an important concern to address, plans have to be 
carefully designed, tested and reformed where necessary to increase access to health care 
and increase financial protection for poor households. It will also be important to go the 
extra mile and carefully create platforms and discussions to better convert research findings 
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Adverse selection Insurers tend to set their 
premiums in relation to the average 
experience of a population. If, in fact, 
members of subsets of the population have 
different probabilities of illness (or at any rate 
they believe they have different probabilities) 
then those with low probabilities (or low 
perceived ones) may not buy insurance and 
those with high probabilities (or perceptions) 
may eagerly seize their opportunity. If this 
happens, insurers end up with clients who are 
likely to prove costlier than expected. High-
risk individuals tend to ‘drive out’ low-risk 
individuals.  
Asset Possessions of value, both real and 
financial. Real assets include land, 
buildings, or machinery owned. Financial 
assets include cash, bank deposits, bonds, 
and stocks. 
Cherry-picking Same as cream skimming. 
Cream skimming A practice in private health 
insurance markets by which the insurer 
obtains a higher proportion of good risks 
(people with a low probability of needing care 
or who are likely to need only low-cost care, 
or both) in their portfolio of clients than the 
insurance premium is calculated on. 
Crowding Out In general, a reduction in 
private expenditure (especially investment) 
that occurs when a government’s 
expansionary fiscal policy (which may be to 
the advantage of the health care sector) 
causes interest rates to rise. In health 
economics, the term has been used to 
describe the effect that public health 
insurance programmes may have on the 
demand for private health care insurance 
Experience-rating The setting of insurance 
premia where the probabilities used are based 
on the historical risk, for example as revealed 
by past claims experience. Cf. Group or 
Community Rating. 
Free rider One who consumes a good 
(especially a public good) without contributing 
to the cost of providing it. 
Free riding Action of a free rider 
Group-rating or Community rating Setting 
health care insurance premia according to the 
utilization of a broad population (for example, 
one defined by employer type or geography).  
Moral hazard This is of two main types. Ex 
ante moral hazard refers to the effect that 
being insured has on behaviour, increasing the 
probability of the event insured against 
occurring. Ex post moral hazard derives from 
the price-elasticity of demand: being insured 
reduces the patient’s price of care and hence 
leads to an increase in demand by insured 
persons. 
Over insurance The situation in which 
settlement of loss in health insurance is 
much more than the loss sustained as to 
encourage the insured to overutilize 
medical care facilities, incur unduly 
expensive insured services or make fake 
claims through malingering. 
Portfolio A collection of different assets 
owned by an individual or firm. 
Risk pooling Insurance pools risks. Since the 
costs of health care can be extremely high, 
uninsured individuals face possible large 
losses. By agreeing to contribute a small 
premium to a common pool held by an insurer 
for use to compensate whoever actually 
suffers the loss, individuals may be able to 
reduce the net costs of risk bearing in a way 
that increases their welfare. Premiums will 
normally include elements beyond the 
expected cost of insured events and their 
probabilities of occurring in order to cover the 
operating costs of the insurer and a return on 
capital (so-called loading). See Adverse 
Selection 
i 
Definitions in the glossary come from the Dictionary of Health economics and the Oxford dictionary of Economics, except 
for overinsurance (Trosper, 1964) and Samaritan Dilemma (Wikipedia) 
Samaritan dilemma Samaritan's dilemma 
is a dilemma in the act of charity. It hinges 
on the idea that when presented with 
charity, in some location such as a soup 
kitchen, a person will act in one of two 
ways: using the charity to improve their 
situation, or coming to rely on charity as a 
means of survival. 
ii 
Definitions in the glossary come from the Dictionary of Health economics and the Oxford dictionary of Economics, except 
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Annex 2: Free care in West Africa for other countries 
 




Annex 3: CBHI coverage and utilization from 2003 to 2010 in Rwanda 
Government NGOs Year
Free voluntary screening and ARV treatment 
in public hospitals
2008
Free treatment against tuberculosis ?
Free treatment against leprosis ?
Subsidized 2012
Subsidized delivery for poor pregnant 
women
2012




Free vaccinations for children under five and 
for pregnant women Expanded Immunization 
Program
Free Tetanos vaccinations for pregnant 
women Expanded Immunization Program
?
Free treatment against harelip in public 
hospital
2013
Subsidization of care for some categories in 
public hospitals (students and others)
?
?
Free voluntary screening and ARV treatment 
in public hospitals
Free treatment against leprosis ?
Free treatment against tuberculosis ?
Free surgery for obstetric fistula Subsidization of care for HIV infected persons ?
Free ARV treatment in public hospitals 2008
Free treatment against tuberculosis ?
Free treatment against leprosis ?
Free treatment against malaria in a certain 
period of days (15)
?
Subsidized  of malaria drugs
Free  malaria care and prophylaxy for 
pregnant women
Free vaccinations for children under five and 
pregnant women through Expanded 
Immunization Program
Subsidization of caesarian sections in some 
hospitals
2011
Subsidization of care for poor and HIV 
infected in public hospitals
Senegal Under 5 free health care Oct-13














Annex 4: NHA completion in West Africa countries 
 
 
Number of releases Last  release year
Benin 0
Burkina Faso 5 2003;2004;2005-2006; 
2007-2008;2009
Cameroon 1 1995
Cote d’Ivoire 1 2007-2008
Guinea 0
Ghana 1 2002
Mali 1 1998-2004
Mauritania 0
Niger 2 2002-2005;2006
Nigeria
Senegal 2 2002;2005
Togo 1 2002
Source: WHO website
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